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Abstract
The article introduces the notion of discourse metaphor,rela vely stable meta-
phorical mappings that function as a key framing device within a particular dis-
course over a certain period of time. Discourse metaphors are illustrated by case
studies from three lines of research: on the cultural imprint of metaphors, on the
negotiation of metaphors and on cross-linguistic occurrence. The source concepts
of discourse metaphors refer to phenomenologically salient real or fictitious objects
that are part of interactional space (i.e., can be pointed at, like MACHINES  or
HOUSES )and/or occupy an important place in cultural imagination. Discourse
metaphors change both over time and across the discourses where they are used.
The implications of focussing on different types of source domains for our thinking
about the embodiment and sociocultural situatedness of metaphor is discussed, with
particular reference to recent developments in Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Re-
search on discourse suggests that situatedness is a crucial factor in the functioning
and dynamics of metaphor.
Keywords: conceptual metaphor theory, discourse analysis, discourse metaphors,
schematicity, sociocultural situatedness.
1. Introduction
This article introduces the notion of discourse metaphor to the cognitive
and social study of metaphor. By discourse metaphor we mean
arelatively stable metaphorical projection that functions as a key framing
device within a particular discourse over a certain period of time.
Examples of discourse metaphors are FRANKENFOOD , EUROPE IS A HOUSE ,
NATURE IS A BOOK ,or THE STATE IS A MACHINE .
In Cognitive Linguistics, metaphor has attracted immense interest as a
pervasive process of meaning creation. Highly schematic metaphorical
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mappings, motivated by the experience of correlations between sensori-
motor functioning and subjective judgement, have been hypothesised to be
at the core of much of human cognition. Examples of these so-caled pri-
mary conceptual metaphors are KNOWING IS SEEING,STATES ARE LO-
CATIONS,AFFECTION IS WARMTH, orIMPORTANT IS BIG (Grady 1997; La-
koff and Johnson 1999).
In the folowing we want to explore the differences between discourse
metaphors and (primary) conceptual metaphors, and discuss their implica-
tions for our understanding of embodiment and sociocultural situatedness
within a cognitive linguistic framework. We believe that such a discussion
is useful, because ever more research on metaphor is carried out on the
basis of naturaly occurring text and talk. Much of what seems central to
the study of metaphor in discourse (context-boundedness, strategical fuzzi-
ness, ideological bias) has, until recently, received litle atention in the
cognitive linguistic literature, but things are beginning to change.1
The structure of this article is as folows. First, we provide a brief over-
view of various on-going case studies of metaphor in discourse (2). This
wil ilustrate some of the characteristics of discourse metaphors, and alow
us to explicate the differences in comparison to proposals about more
schematic mappings made in the literature. We discuss the cross-linguistic
occurrence of particular mappings, the ontological status of mappings on
different levels (phenomenological salience of discourse metaphors vs.
hypothetical status of primary metaphors), the evolution/life-span of par-
ticular metaphorical mappings, and the cultural imprint of metaphors (3).
We then discuss the implications of different approaches to metaphor for
our understanding of the embodiment of figurative language, and argue that
discourse metaphors provide evidence for the sociocultural situatedness of
metaphorical reasoning (4). Finaly, we position our argument within the
wider discussion on the “dual grounding” (Sinha 1999) of human cognition
in the cognitive sciences (5).
1. Cf. Frank’s contribution (this volume)which explores various aspects of the
applicability of the discourse metaphor framework outlined here. Indeed, that
study might be viewed as a first step in filing this gap. See also Zinken (in
press) and Musolf and Zinken (in press)
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2. Case studies
This section is intended to highlight particular insights from discourse
studies on metaphor that are important to the objective of our article. Spe-
cificaly, we wish to make three points that characterize discourse meta-
phors. These regard the cultural component in discourse metaphors, their
basis in interactional as wel as individual cognitive processes (cf.
Bernárdez this volume), and their occurrence across languages. The sum-
mary of some case studies in this section wil alow us to point out the dif-
ferences between discourse metaphors and primary metaphors. The results
described here stem from Nerlich’s research on cultural scripts in discourse
on animal and human diseases, such as FMD and SARS (see Larson, Ner-
lich and Walis 2005; Walis and Nerlich 2005; Larson this volume), Hel-
sten’s research on systemic and contested properties of metaphors in dis-
course (Helsten 2002, 2003; Nerlich and Helsten 2004) and Baranov and
Zinken’s research on the cross-linguistic comparison of metaphors as dis-
course practices (Baranov and Zinken 2003; Baranov and Zinken 2004;
Zinken 2004; cf. also Zybatow 1998).
2.1. Discourse metaphors employ cultural knowledge
Larson, Nerlich and Walis (2005) have analysed media discourses sur-
rounding policies of biosecurity, implemented when nations or the world as
awhole are faced with biorisks, such as invasive species or invasive dis-
eases. The examples studied were foot and mouth disease (FMD) (an old
animal disease that broke out in the UK in 2001) and SARS (a new form of
pneumonia or flu which broke out in China in 2003 and spread to the
West). Metaphor schemas preserving a relatively high level of specificity
and relatively rich cultural knowledge in the source domain such as
HANDLING A DISEASES IS A WAR or AVIRUS IS A KILLER can be used in
these circumstances as a way of expressing a (preliminary) understanding
as wel as evoking an emotive response. They can also be used to frame
policies intended to halt the spread of the disease in question. Using the
wrong policy framed by the wrong metaphor can have devastating social,
economic, psychological and animal welfare consequences. In such con-
texts the import of metaphor extends beyond individual cognition, into the
realm of society and culture.
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Scientists and policy makers might use certain culturaly available and
historicaly entrenched metaphors to frame scientific discoveries or poli-
cies, without initialy reflecting on the wider implications their choices
might have – for instance the kiling of around eight milion animals in the
“war” against FMD. In this case a relatively harmless animal disease virus
that poses no risks to human health was framed, for mainly political and
economic reasons, as a deadly kiler and invisible enemy that had to be
“stamped out” at al costs. This shows that “[m]etaphors, which entice us
‘to understand and experience one kind of thing in terms of another’ [..]
play a central role in the construction of social and political reality” (Annas
1995: 744, quoting Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 156). Using wel-entrenched
metaphors and policies of war has, however, various drawbacks in the
framing of disease control programs, the most serious of which is perhaps
that “[m]ilitary thinking concentrates on the physical, sees control as cen-
tral, and encourages the expenditure of massive resources to achieve domi-
nance” (Annas 1995: 746).
The use of metaphors is not innocuous – it can have social costs and so-
cial benefits. It is therefore not only necessary to investigate the content of
ametaphor and ask
What does a particular metaphor express, and how? There is […] another
question that needs to be asked: How felicitous is a particular metaphor in a
particular context (e.g., solving a problem, obtaining consensus, elucidating
dificult subject mater, and so on)? (Mey 2001: 62)
This is a question asked by a discursive or pragmatic approach to meta-
phor.
Some of the most important schemas that can be used to “obtain con-
sensus” in certain socio-political and discursive situations are those of
CONTAINMENT,FORCE and BALANCE.In the discourses on FMD and SARS
we have found metaphors based on such (image) schemas. However, unlike
Lakoff and Johnson, who seem to embrace what some cal an “unsituated
view of embodiment” (Bono 2001: 219; cf. also Zlatev 1997), we think
metaphors based on such schemas need to be explored in the cultural con-
text in which they are used, specificaly, in terms of their sociocultural
situatedness.
As Paul Chilton has pointed out in an article on “The meaning of secu-
rity”: “Diseases are typicaly imagined as invading the body from outside, a
notion which rests both on the CONTAINER schema and the warfare script.”
(Chilton 1996: 197). Scripts and schemas interact to give metaphors dis-
cursive potency and to make certain metaphors plausible in certain situa-
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tions. However, conceiving diseases as invaders and the control of disease
as war might not have always been the case in the past, and might not have
to be how we conceive of disease in the future (see Chilton 1996: 201). We
found for example that the “war” metaphor was much less used in the UK
media reporting on SARS than in the UK media reporting on FMD because
the metaphor was a more plausible framing device in the later situation
than in the former (Walis and Nerlich 2005). Discourse metaphors have a
social and cultural history and they influence social and cultural futures.
Take, for example, the metaphors of ‘balance’ and ‘warfare’ that have char-
acterized diferent epochs of medical thought in the West. The Hippocratic
and Galenic ideals of health as a balance of humours, or active bodily fluids
authorized a particular set of relationships between individual bodies, and
their external environment, and led to the cultivation of certain regimes of
bodily care and control. By contrast, the ‘embatled’ body of modern germ
theory adopts a quite diferent set of relations to its hostile external envi-
ronmental and enforces on itself – and on society more generaly – a strin-
gent medicalized, socio-political regime. (Bono 2001: 225)
The study of conceptual metaphors has proliferated since the 1980s. How-
ever, cognitive linguists have rarely examined the repeated or continued
use of such metaphors in times of emotional turmoil or in times of scien-
tific or political uncertainty. This is a gap that needs to be filed if we want
to understand how general and local aspects of culture and cognition inter-
act in the ways people think and act in “the real world” (see Zinken, Hel-
sten and Nerlich 2003). Here, metaphor is frequently used not only to un-
derstand inherently unstructured abstract concepts, but also as a heuristic
device for exploring something global which is beyond normal comprehen-
sion and/or might directly threaten our health, wel-being or survival.
More research is needed to find out whether in times of scientific or
political uncertainty, or during times of social upheaval, discourse meta-
phors, such as the WAR AGAINST DISEASES metaphor, become atractors for
cultural commonplaces, cultural myths and salient events of the past. This
“cultural” motivation of metaphor could be described as a kind of inter-
textuality (Zinken, Helsten and Nerlich 2003). On the one hand, these
metaphorical and cognitive constants seem to be discursively embedded in
arelatively stable reservoir of cultural myths and social representations
available in social memory – e.g., memories of past wars and past epidem-
ics, or of weeds, plagues and displacements (see Cresswel 1997). On the
other hand, they can draw on knowledge of current social and political
events, such as, in the case of the fight against SARS, the concurrent “war
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against terror”, the war in Iraq and threats of bioterrorism. SARS can there-
fore be conceptualised either as an ancient plague with al the old imagery
that surrounds this concept or as a “bioterrorism of nature” (Riddel 2003),
evoking much newer concepts and fears. Discourse metaphors seem to be
stable over long periods of time but they evolve and adapt to changing
socio-political circumstances (see Nerlich and Helsten 2004; Musolff
2004, this volume;Nerlich 2005; Frank this volume). They might also tie
up with and reinforce long traditions of political thought, ideologies or
entrenched cultural values (see White and Herrera 2003: 277). Sustained
use of certain discourse metaphors contributes to giving a discourse or
discursive practice “its overal coherence and communicative edge” (ibid.).
2.2. Discourse metaphors evolve in historical time
Helsten (2003, 2005) has been tracing the metaphors of FRANKENFOODS
and THE GENOME IS THE BOOK OF LIFE over time and across different dis-
courses. The FRANKENFOOD metaphor was used in agricultural biotechnol-
ogy discourse, while the BOOK OF LIFE metaphor was and is pervasive in
the medical biotechnology discourse (Kay 2000). The main point we wish
to make in this section is that the meanings of discourse metaphors co-
evolve with the cultures in which they are used. Conceptual metaphors are
considered universal, independent of time while discourse metaphors
change with the ongoing discourses (see also Musolff this volume), and are
used for specific purposes (Helsten 2000).
Discourse metaphors reflect the cultural and social preoccupations of
the time. New topics and events are often discussed in terms of cultural and
mythical commonplaces; the target domain of the metaphor may be new
while the source domain is much older. The metaphor of GM-FOODS ARE
FRANKENFOODS,for instance, was coined only in 1992, while the source
domain, the myth of FRANKENSTEIN'SMONSTER has triggered people’s
imagination ever since Mary Sheley’s novel was published in 1818, and
has been used in various text traditions. The cultural image of scientists
creating potentialy dangerous, new Frankenstein monsters in their labora-
tories is readily applicable to certain aspects of science and technology.
This image has been used in public debates on geneticaly modified foods,
for example. The metaphor of FRANKENFOODS gained its “momentum” in
Europe after 1996 as a reaction against the US import of geneticaly ma-
nipulated crops. In other words, it became a one-issue metaphor within the
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debate on GM-foods. It was first used by environmental and consumer
related NGOs, in particular, Friends of the Earth, and spread to the mass
media in between 1998 and 1999. In the UK, the metaphor was also used in
the political decision making on GM-foods. The metaphor faded away
from the public agenda when the debate on GM-foods calmed down after
2000, but is stil with us today. The UK tabloid newspaper The Daily Mail
stil runs, for example, a so-caled Frankenstein Food Watch campaign.
Successful discourse metaphors can resonate across a wide variety of
discourses, topics, and over time. The source domain of Frankenstein’s
monster can be mapped onto a wide variety of target domains, but it seems
to carry a relatively fixed set of associations and connotations with it, often
referring to the unpredictable negative outcomes of scientific activity.
Hence, it is readily made use of in new cultural situations, such as the in-
troduction of geneticaly manipulated crops into the European markets.
Because of this relatively stable set of associations, the metaphor of Frank-
enfoods and the related metaphors of Frankenfish,Frankencorn and
Frankenmilk can be effectively used to cal for action against the GM
foods.
In a similar way, the metaphor of THE GENOME IS THE BOOK OF LIFE,
widely used in the debate on genomics, is both novel and old. The source
domain of THE BOOK OF LIFE has been in use ever since Antiquity, and has
along history within the Judeo-Christian tradition where it refers to natu-
ral, eternal and universal texts (Kay 2000: 31).2In the Book of Revelation,
the names of those to be saved from the Apocalypse are writen in the
“book of life”. Paralel to the BOOK OF LIFE runs the BOOK OF NATURE,
common in the history of the natural sciences, where science was perceived
as an effort to read and write the book of nature.For Galileo, the book of
nature was writen in the language of mathematics (Cohen 1994).
According to Kay (2000), the metaphor of the BOOK OF LIFE gained its
current scientific legitimacy in the debates on genetics when it was con-
nected to the discourse of information: genes carry the information, the
instructions for the formation of organisms. The connection between cel-
lular systems and the alphabet first became popular in the 1960s when
molecular biologists started using the metaphor for understanding the
2. The metaphor would deserve a more detailed study, which might investigate the
emergence of a discourse metaphor from “errors” or “variations” in translation.
The phrase “book of life” in Revelation has a contested history as it migrated
from various Latin versions of the Bible to its English instantiation.
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working of the DNA (van Dijck 1998: 123), as composed of the four nu-
cleotides represented by their initial leters, adenine (A), thymine (T), cyto-
sine (C) and guanine (G). A, T, C and G became the alphabet of life.Dur-
ing the Human Genome Project, between 1990 and 2003, the metaphor was
effectively used to promote the research project to increase public aware-
ness of the research project, and ever new formulations of it are now being
used to promote post-genomic research (Helsten 2005). The metaphor has
co-evolved with the genome project, from discussing DNA in terms of the
alphabet to comparing the different genomic books of humans and mice,
for example.
Resonance over time, across topics and across different domains of use
in society makes discourse metaphors apt tools for communication. The
metaphor of “the book of life”, for instance, has moved diachronicaly from
the Bible to modern sciences and to the genome, in particular from gene
sequencing to genome annotating, and from lexical to semantic structures.
Across topics, the metaphor has been used in the debates on genetics and
genomics as wel as in the debates on biodiversity where nature is some-
times considered as “the library of life” (Väliverronen and Helsten 2002).
The metaphor has also provided resonance across the different societal
domains that participate in the debates, such as the sciences, the social
sciences and the mass media (see also Helsten 2000). The metaphors of
FRANKENFOOD and THE BOOK OF LIFE carry familiar cultural images
(Frankenstein myth and apocalypse myth) that gain resonance when refor-
mulated to fit into new contexts (GM foods and genetics/genomics).
Discourse metaphors evolve as part of communication and text tradi-
tions, in the social use of the metaphors. Some of these metaphors become
narrative metaphors3(NATURE IS AN OBJECT;NATURE IS A BOOK)and gain
avery prominent position within a given culture while other, one-issue
metaphors have a shorter life-span (FRANKENFOOD).
Thus far we have focussed on diachronic aspects of discourse meta-
phors, but discourse metaphors can be traced synchronicaly as wel by
comparing the width of discourses that use a certain metaphor as a key-
grasp. The novel metaphor STEM CELLS ARE LIFE’SMAGIC CAULDRON is
3. The concept “narrative metaphor” is introduced in Helsten (2002) and refers to
very strongly entrenched metaphorical cultural models. Where discourse meta-
phors may vary from one-issue metaphors, i.e., metaphors such as Frankenfood,
that are purposefuly coined to advance certain interests at the expense of oth-
ers, to more general metaphors such as “nature is a book”, narrative metaphors
often provide wider cultural views on the issue.
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probably part of a specialist discourse, and therefore is much more re-
stricted than CLONES ARE COPIES,which, in turn, is more restricted than
NATURE IS A BOOK.But this novel metaphor links the new phenomenon of
stem cels to old cultural knowledge about magic and miracle.
Discourse metaphors are communicative and cultural tools, and as such
potentialy more variable than the highly schematic mappings proposed
within Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT).
2.3. Discourse metaphors occur across languages
Baranov and Zinken (2003, 2004) have conducted cross-linguistic research
on the metaphors used in Russian and German newspapers to talk about
political transformations in the two countries in the late 1980s and early
1990s. In this project the focus was on source domains, the goal was to
compare the scope of target domains understood via a particular source
domain in these languages, as wel as investigating the similarities and
differences within source domains between the languages.
Russian and German are genealogicaly and typologicaly related Indo-
European languages, and the cultural heritage shared within the area is
considerable. It is therefore not surprising that there is a vast number of
metaphors that are common in both Russian and German public discourse.
However, there is also considerable diversity.
Firstly, there is diversity in the use of metaphors for a specific target
domain. E.g., in the Russian media, the discourse metaphor for the target
domain transformation was TRANSFORMATION IS REBUILDING (perestro-
jka), the source domain being BUILDING.In the German discourse, the dis-
course metaphor for the same target domain was TRANSFORMATION IS A
TURN (Wende), using the source domain MOVEMENT. Obviously,
BUILDING-metaphors are also documented in the German discourse, and
MOVEMENT-metaphors are documented in the Russian discourse. However,
both quantitative and qualitative data suggest that understanding socio-
political change as a MOVEMENT was a discourse practice in the German
discourse of the time whereas it wasn’t one in the Russian discourse, and
conversely understanding socio-economic change in terms of (RE-)
BUILDING was a discourse practice in the Russian, but not in the German
media (Baranov and Zinken 2003).
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Secondly, there are differences in the use of particular source domains.
As an example, let us look at the source domain FLORA.Table 1 shows part
of the semantic frame of the metaphor model FLORA:4
Table 1. Compiled sections of the semantic trees for the metaphor model FLORA.
Descriptor/Russian database Descriptor/German database ‘English gloss’
FLORA (LEVEL 0)
1.1. Flora (level 0)
‘FLORA’
 -
(LEVEL 1)
TEIL EINER PFLANZE/EINES
BAUMS (LEVEL 1)
‘PART OF A
PLANT/TREE’
- (level 2) Zweig (level 2) ‘branch’
 (level
3)
Verästelung (level 3) ‘ramification’
 (level 2) Wurzel (level 2) ‘root’
As can be seen in table 1, both the Russian and the German discourse use
the concepts of a branch and of roots on level 2 in the subdomain hierarchy
metaphoricaly in public discourse. Furthermore, both languages have the
same metaphors, mapping branches onto economic domains, so that difer-
ent branches of an economy denote different economic domains, and map-
ping roots – as in her political roots – onto traditions or the beginning of a
political process.These are typical discourse metaphors in the sense of our
definition in (1). However, ramification, asubdomain of branch,is used in
the German corpus only, where it is a common metaphor in talking about
the target domain of questionably close institutional links.(e.g., between
companies). Not only is there no metaphor CLOSE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS
ARE RAMIFICATIONS in the Russian corpus, there is no mapping whatsoever
of X ARE RAMIFICATIONS with X being any target domain. In other words,
the gaps in discourse mappings vary cross-linguisticaly. Whereas ramifi-
cations as part of the domain branch is mapped onto the domain of econ-
omy in German discourse, such a mapping does not occur in Russian dis-
4. Inverted leters mean that no metaphor in the corpus was coded in the database
using the respective descriptor. Smal Caps indicate level 1 in the subdomain
hierarchy, indentations indicate level 3.
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course. This is a problematic case for atempts to account for the details of
complex metaphors by reducing them onto hypothesized universal primary
metaphors.
Generaly speaking, cross-linguistic occurrence on levels 1 and 3 in the
subdomain hierarchy turned out to be more restricted than on level 2. This
alows for the hypothesis that basic level concepts (Rosch et al. 1976) are
cross-linguisticaly more salient as metaphorical source concepts than con-
cepts on the superordinate and subordinate domains. One implication of
this is that lexicalisation paterns have to be given more prominence in
accounting for the motivation of metaphor (cf. Evans 2004 for a related
plea). E.g., the fact that there is a ramification-metaphor in the German
corpus (the German word is Verästelung) but notin the Russian one is
probably best explained by the productivity of the German prefix Ver- in
metaphorical meaning extension.5
It is important to point out that we did not a priori claim a link between
the hierarchy of (sub-) domain levels and the notion of discourse meta-
phors. The nesting of levels within a domain is a cognitive phenomenon
that is part of conceptualisation (Croft 2003; Langacker 1987). Discourse
metaphors were initialy defined in social terms: they are mappings that
regularly appear in discourse on the actual linguistic “surface” (social sta-
bility), which indicates a certain phenomenological salience of discourse
metaphors to speakers. Although these factors (social stability and middle
level in subdomain hierarchy) are logicaly independent, there does in fact
seem to be a relation between them, so that discourse metaphors usualy
make use of source concepts from the middle level of categorisation.
3. Embodiment and metaphor theory: discourse metaphors and
primary  metaphors
The latest elaborations of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Grady 1997; La-
koff and Johnson 1999; Grady and Johnson 2003) emphasize that metaphor
is a strong source of evidence for the embodiment of cognition. In this
context, both the terms metaphor and embodiment are understood in a par-
ticular way. In this and the next sections, we wil briefly spel out our
reading of this understanding of metaphor and embodiment. As we do so, it
wil become clear that the type of metaphor we have found to be most sali-
5. We would like to thank René Dirven for drawing our atention to this.
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ent in discourse in section 1 (discourse metaphors) differs in various ways
from primary metaphors. We argue that the particular characteristics of
discourse metaphors add to our understanding of the phenomenological
aspect of embodiment and our understanding of the relation between em-
bodiment and sociocultural situatedness.
We mentioned three case studies in order to make three points about
discourse metaphors: they use knowledge associated with basic level con-
cepts; they evolve in social interaction; and they are firmly linked to cul-
tural scripts and stereotypes. These three findings taken together seem suf-
ficient to make the claim that discourse metaphors are a distinct
phenomenon that needs to be accounted for in a cognitive theory of meta-
phor.6
3.1. Phenomenological salience
As mentioned at the beginning of the article, examples of primary meta-
phors are KNOWING IS SEEING,STATES ARE LOCATIONS,AFFECTION IS
WARMTH, orIMPORTANT IS BIG.These are regarded as primary in two
senses. They are primary in the sense that they are the first conceptual
metaphorical mappings acquired in childhood as a result of recurrent cor-
relations between sensori-motor experience and subjective judgement of
this experience. But they are also regarded as primary in the sense that al
or nearly al the metaphors that we use or hear in communication are
thought to be derived from a relatively smal set of these primary meta-
phors. As the term primary metaphor indicates, in this line of research it is
this type of metaphor that is regarded as most important, or basic in under-
standing the cognitive functions of metaphor:7We need to know how pri-
mary metaphors work, if we want to understand why we have the secon-
dary or tertiary metaphors that we do.
An example of this approach is Grady’s analysis of the proposed meta-
phorical mapping THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS (Grady and Johnson 2003).
6. By a cognitive theory of metaphor we mean any theory that tries to account for
the role of metaphor in conceptualisation, as opposed to the term Conceptual
Metaphor Theory relating to the school of Lakof and coleagues.
7. Consequently, Özçalikan (2003) uses the term “basic level” to denote the level
of primary metaphors and primary scenes in the sense of Grady and Johnson
(2003). Here, the term is used referring to a middle level of conceptualisation
(e.g., Rosch et al. (1976)).
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Grady noticed that there are gaps in this mapping, i.e., not al of our expe-
rientialy acquired knowledge about buildings is mapped onto theories –
e.g., we don’t conventionaly talk about a theory having no windows.
Talking about theories in terms of buildings (e.g., laying the foundations
for a new theory)is a complex mapping that is constrained by two primary
metaphors: PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT and ORGANISATION IS
PHYSICAL STRUCTURE.Only the inferential paterns of primary metaphors
are mapped onto the complex metaphor.
Asimilar reduction of discourse metaphors onto primary metaphors
would surely be possible. However, while discourse studies do not provide
any evidence against the possibility of the existence of primary metaphors,
they certainly do not suggest that discourse metaphors are motivated by
such simpler mappings. In fact, there are reasons for claiming that in dis-
cursive reasoning, arguing and framing, metaphors like BELONGING IS
HAVING ROOTS,CLONES ARE COPIES,NATION-STATES ARE HOUSES etc. are
the basic imaginative acts. One reason for this is that discourse metaphors
are, as ilustrated above, very frequent and cross-culturaly wide-spread,
while the link between hypothesised abstract metaphor schemas like
PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT and observable linguistic behaviour is
much weaker. Notions of belonging,cloning and nation-states are in the
very focus of discourse, while a general notion like persisting never is.
Framing belonging as rootedness,cloning as copying, ornation-states as
houses is contested in discourse, framing persisting as remaining erect
never is.
But the point is not just to say that more specific phrasings of a map-
ping are more likely to appear on the linguistic surface of text and talk than
very abstract generalisations. The important point is that it is possible, by
means of looking at the linguistic surface,to identify a level of conceptual
projection from a source domain that seems to be most likely to become
entrenched in a discourse and that is most stable cross-linguisticaly,
namely the level of discourse metaphors, based on source concepts from
the basic level of categorisation. Moreover, the source domains of dis-
course metaphors have a high degree of phenomenological salience, while
the source domains of primary metaphors don’t. Of course, this is just what
exponents of conceptual metaphor theory would say, and we wil discuss
the implications for a particular understanding of the embodiment of cog-
nition below.
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3.2. Evolution in historical time
As ilustrated in 2.2., discourse metaphors evolve over historical time in
social interaction. Some have a short life span, like FRANKENFOOD,some
stay on to become entrenched cultural models, like NATURE IS A BOOK or
DISEASES ARE INVADERS.What they share is that they “live” in the semio-
sphere (Lotman 1990). Individuals encounter them in discourse, take them
up, modify or reject them. They become part of situated discursive and
narrative practices.
Primary metaphors, by contrast, are hypothesised to be acquired as the
result of non-semiotic experience. This view of metaphors as fundamental
conceptual structures does not account for the flexible evolution of meta-
phors in use. It should be pointed out that there seem to be some differ-
ences between older versions of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and
Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987, 1993), and newer elaborations (Grady 1997;
Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Grady 1999; Grady and Johnson 2003). In older
versions, social organisation and culture are mentioned as one relevant
aspect of experience:
In other words, what we cal ‘direct physical experience’ is never merely a
mater of having a body of a certain sort: rather every experience takes place
within a vast background of cultural presuppositions. (Lakof and Johnson
1980: 57)
In more recent elaborations, cognitive development and the acquisition of
primary metaphors are more explicitly modeled as an individual endeav-
our. Discourse data suggest that an account of individual metaphorical
reasoning needs to take into consideration the interactional negotiation of
perspectives and the entrenchment of projected perspectives in terms of
concept elaboration (Evans 2004).
3.3. Cultural component
Conceptual Metaphor Theory is predominantly interested in universal as-
pects of metaphor. Primary metaphors are more or less explicitly claimed
to be universal (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Grady and Johnson 2003;
Özçalikan 2003). Such a claim is not made with respect to complex meta-
phors, but the culture-specific component should be irrelevant, if, as
claimed in CMT, the metaphorical potential of complex metaphors is re-
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stricted to the inferential paterns of the primary metaphors constraining
them.
We would argue that relatively rich images resulting from our cultural
experience and interaction(s) with the world lie at the heart of metaphorical
reasoning in discourse. A classic example of the sociocultural situatedness
of metaphorical reasoning is Chilton and Ilyin’s (1993) discussion of the
metaphor EUROPE IS A HOUSE in Russian and Western European discourse.
Chilton and Ilyin show that the differences in the stereotypes of a house in
Russia and in some Western European countries led to vastly different
inferences in envisaging European politics. The metaphor model FLORA
also shows that sociocultural values and traditions are not irrelevant to
metaphorical reasoning in the real world: the fact that FLORA-metaphors V
–as opposed to ORGANISM-metaphors – usualy throw a positive light on
the target domain in Russian and German discourse is explained best by the
romantic tradition in European culture, which entrenched an idylic, and
generaly speaking a positive picture of nature.
CMT is vague with respect to a point that is important in this context.
There does not seem to be a clear stance on whether in reasoning meta-
phoricaly, we carry out online-extensions within the source domain or not.
In other words, in talking of a wel-founded theory, does the hypothesised
primary metaphor ORGANISATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE become acti-
vated every time? Or is the primary metaphor regarded as the diachronic
starting-point of building-metaphors, without being necessarily accessed
when we reason about theories in terms of this metaphor (cf. Gibbs 1999)?
The first position would involve a strong grounding of reasoning in uni-
versal aspects of conceptualisation (because primary metaphors are mod-
eled as universal). The second position would mean that the actual dis-
course metaphors entrenched in a community are the tools of our reasoning
–that we reason in terms of the culture-specific information-chunks en-
trenched in symbols rather than breaking down these chunks into their
possibly universal pieces.
In summary, the major difference between primary metaphors and dis-
course metaphors lies in the type of source domain regarded as basic for
metaphorical activity in the two approaches. This issue wil be discussed in
the context of notions of embodiment in the next section.
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4. (How) are discourse metaphors embodied?
Embodiment is understood in a variety of ways within the cognitive sci-
ences (Ziemke 2003). In the approach most influential in metaphor theory,
three main aspects of the embodiment of cognition are distinguished: neu-
ral embodiment, embodiment on the phenomenological level, and embodi-
ment in the cognitive unconscious (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 102ff.).
As has become evident in the above discussions, conceptual metaphor
theory prefers to treat metaphor as evidence for the grounding of cognition
in the cognitive unconscious. The entities regarded as “basic” in under-
standing metaphor as a cognitive phenomenon are hypothesised entities
located in the cognitive unconscious: image schemas and primary meta-
phors.8
We have tried to ilustrate that discourse studies provide evidence for
the sociocultural situatedness of metaphorical reasoning. The basic entities
are source domains which are associated with rich images of (real or ficti-
tious) objects salient in the cultural Umwelt.Whereas the source domains
of primary metaphors are very abstract (as in PERSISTING IS BEING ERECT,
ORGANISATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE), the source domains of discourse
metaphors are part of the interactional and cultural space: material objects
that can be touched and pointed at (e.g., ANATION-STATE IS A HOUSE,THE
STATE IS A MACHINE) orconcepts that have a strong cultural image or value
atached to them, due to textual, semiotic traditions (as in SOCIETY IS AN
ORGAN,REVOLUTIONARY EVENTS ARE A STORM,BELONGING IS HAVING
ROOTS,GRATEFULNESS IS BEING IN DEBT). Discourse metaphors provide
evidence for the cognitive usefulness of the culturaly accumulated knowl-
edge entrenched in (source domain) symbols.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) point out that al three levels of embodiment
(the neural, the phenomenological and the cognitive unconscious) must be
kept in view if we want to account for the embodiment of language and
cognition. Surely many aspects of language and cognition are unconscious.
However, it seems to us that more atention to the phenomenological level
of embodiment and to sociocultural situatedness could make some hypo-
thetical assumptions about entities in this unconscious realm superfluous
(Zlatev 2002, BLM volume 1 2007)
8Cf. also the discussion of the “cognitive unconscious” in Zlatev (BLM volume 1).
                   257
5. Metaphor, embodiment and dual grounding
The main point of this article in the context of this volume has been to
argue that an explanation of the functioning and dynamics of metaphor
needs to address not only the embodiment of cognition, but also the
empowerment of cognition through symbols (Tomaselo 1999; Gentner
2003). The supplementation of the individualist view on cognition in Con-
ceptual Metaphor Theory with a socioculturaly situated view is the objec-
tive of several of the articles in this volume. The ultimate goal is an ac-
count of the “dual grounding” (Sinha 1999) of human cognition in both
biology and culture – to account for the fact that human cognition, like al
animal cognition, is constrained by biology, but that it is, unlike other ani-
mal cognition, not bound by the skin (Bateson 1972). We have tried to
make a step into this direction by arguing that:
1. in discourse metaphors, knowledge associated with basic level catego-
ries is projected onto the target domain;
2. the conventionalisation of a particular projection into a discourse prac-
tice is a socio-cultural process;
3. discourse metaphors therefore provide evidence for the social situated-
ness as wel as the phenomenological embodiment of metaphor.
If metaphorical thought fundamentaly involves the images and feelings
embedded in our culture, then this highlights another aspect of embodi-
ment, one which seems fundamental to human cognition: embodiment as a
process, the process of incorporating the symbolicaly accumulated ideas
and values of our felow men and ancestors (Bourdieu 1977; Tomaselo
1999). A focus on embodiment might therefore usefuly be supplemented
by a focus on enculturation.The term enculturation is normaly used to
describe the adoption of the behaviour paterns of the surrounding culture
or the socialisation of children to the norms of their culture, but this term
could also be used to describe the adoption of certain metaphorical paterns
for thinking about the world, acting in the world, for imagining the past
and future and for framing current crises. As Clifford Geertz wrote in his
1973 colection of essays and ethnography, The Interpretation of Culture:
[C]ulture is best seen [..] as a set of control mechanisms – plans, recipes,
rules, instructions [..] – for the governing of behavior. [And] man is pre-
cisely the animal most desperately dependent upon such extragenetic, out-
side-the-skin control mechanisms, such as cultural programs, for ordering
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behavior (p. 44). [While these ideas are not new], the results of recent re-
search have made them susceptible of more precise statement as wel as
lending them a degree of empirical support they did not previously have. [..]
The control mechanism view of culture begins with the assumption that hu-
man thought is basicaly both social and public – that its natural habitat is
the house yard, the marketplace, and the town square. Thinking consists not
of ‘happenings in the head’ but in a trafic in what has been caled by G. H.
Mead and others, significant symbols – words for the most part but also
gestures, drawings, musical sounds, mechanical devices like clocks, or natu-
ral objects like jewels – anything in fact that is disengaged from its mere
actuality and used to impose meaning on experience [..]. (Geertz 1973: 45)
To this list we would add discourse metaphors.
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